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WITHOUT OTHER OPTIONS: THE LIMITED 
EFFECTIVENESS, UNIQUE AVAILABILITY, 
AND OVERALL IMPACT OF STATE-
DIRECTED LAWSUITS AGAINST 
PREDATORY LENDERS 
Justin Collins* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent months, people reading or watching the news have 
been bombarded with stories about subprime loans, a sharp rise in 
foreclosures, and the tenuous state of the mortgage industry.
1
 In 
2006, there were 1.2 million foreclosure filings in the United 
States—up 42 percent from 2005.2 Based on current rates in 2006, 
foreclosure filings are predicted to rise to two million in 2007, a 
                                                        
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A. in Urban Studies, University 
of Pennsylvania, 2004. The author would like to thank Mom, Dad, Alex, and 
Sona, for all their support throughout this entire process, as well as Professor 
David Reiss and the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for the advice and 
guidance they provided in connection with this Note. 
1 See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Democrats Prepare Bills to Tighten 
Loan Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at C1; Editorial, Subprime Mortgages: 
Get Help to Homeowners, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 4, 2007; Housing Woes Hurt 
NovaStar and Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at C10; Subprime Squeeze 
Hits Automakers; Fewer Buyers Finance Cars, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at 
A01; Adam Thomson, Regulators’ Call to Help Homeowners, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2007, at 8. These articles represent only a fraction of the articles appearing in 
major national and international newspapers during the week of September 3, 
2007, discussing the current crisis in the subprime loan industry. 
2 RealtyTrac is a real estate resource site billing itself as ―The nation‘s # 1 
source of foreclosure listings.‖ RealtyTrac Home Page, http://www.realtytrac. 
com (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
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rate approaching heights not seen since the Great Depression.
3
 At 
the core of this crisis is the subprime loan industry, which 
furnishes high-interest loans to individuals and families with ―less 
than pristine credit‖ that cannot qualify for a loan at the prime 
interest rate because they are considered to be higher credit risks.
4
 
The media has failed to address the predatory nature of many of 
these loans, which are generally given to low-income borrowers.
5
 
The clustering of these predatory loans in at-risk, low- and 
moderate-income communities has resulted in mass foreclosure 
and the destruction of entire neighborhoods and communities.
6
 
Home ownership is increasingly touted as a community 
development strategy and a means for lower-income Americans to 
accumulate wealth, achieve financial stability, and move into the 
middle class.
7
 However, predatory lending has gradually eroded 
                                                        
3 Nelson Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at BU1. 
4 Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of 
Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2277 (2004). 
5 Id. 
6 Emily Brady, Stranger at the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at CY4. 
A clear example of the clustering of predatory loans in a community and 
resulting foreclosures is Southeastern Queens. Id. In communities of color in 
that part of New York City, studies have demonstrated notably high levels of 
foreclosures, which have been attributed to higher rates of subprime lending. Id.  
Foreclosed properties damage the value of nearby homes and the tax 
bases of municipalities. There is also a strong correlation between 
foreclosures and crime rates. For every one percentage point increase in 
a neighborhood‘s foreclosure rate, violent crime rises 2.3 percent, 
according to a recent study by Dan Immergluck of the Georgia Institute 
of Technology and Geoff Smith of Woodstock Institute, a research and 
advocacy organization in Chicago.  
Editorial, Spreading the Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at A30. 
Furthermore, housing vacancies appear to lead to prostitution, vagrancy, and 
drug dealing. Id. 
7 Kathe Newman, Race, Politics, and Community Development in U.S. 
Cities: Newark, Decline and Avoidance, Renaissance and Desire: From 
Disinvestment to Reinvestment, 594 ANNALS 34, 35–36 (2004). Newman 
disagrees with the idea of homeownership as an effective economic 
development strategy for the poorest urban neighborhoods, but she notes and 
discusses it as a popular strategy among city and other government officials. Id. 
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communities of homeowners because of lax federal regulations and 
the preemption of state laws.
8
 In the past decade, states have 
responded with a new strategy whereby state Attorneys General 
file suits against unscrupulous lenders.
9
 While these suits have 
received great media attention and have led to multi-million dollar 
settlements,
10
 experts and politicians are still debating whether this 
approach to curbing predatory lending has been, or will be, 
successful. 
This Note will explore the tactic of Attorneys General suing 
predatory lenders, focusing on how it has been only partially 
effective, what it has taught and can continue to teach lawmakers, 
and how it can be effectively used to develop a comprehensive 
anti-predatory lending and consumer protection strategy in the 
future. Part I will provide a background on the development of the 
subprime mortgage industry, the methods utilized by predatory 
lenders, and existing law regarding predatory lending. Part II will 
examine how states have responded to the shortfall of federal law 
and federal restrictions on state action, and will address how states 
have employed the method of Attorneys General filing suits 
against predatory lenders. Part III will evaluate the success of this 
strategy, arguing that while state-directed lawsuits may be the best 
anti-predatory lending tool available in light of federal preemption, 
they have fallen short of stemming systemic change. Additionally, 
Part III will propose potential solutions for the future, based on the 
current activities in the subprime market, and will discuss 
important knowledge gained from state-directed lawsuits to further 
develop anti-predatory lending strategies.  
                                                        
See also U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POL‘Y DEV & 
RESEARCH, IDEAS THAT WORK: BUILDING COMMUNITIES THROUGH 
HOMEOWNERSHIP (2006), available at www.huduser.org/Publications/Pdf/ideas 
thatwork.pdf [hereinafter HUD, IDEAS]. 
8 See Spreading the Misery, supra note 6. 
9 Thomas Miller, Remarks to the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Iowa Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 1 
(Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/ 
releases/aug_2007/Federal_Reserve_HOEPA.pdf. 
10 See infra notes 117–36 and accompanying text. 
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I. BACKGROUND – THE RISE OF THE SUBPRIME INDUSTRY AND 
PREDATORY LENDING 
Home ownership has long been touted as a means to achieve 
financial stability and economic success, for individuals, families, 
and neighborhoods.
11
 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (―HUD‖) refers to homeowners as ―more likely to 
maintain their properties, thereby improving their neighborhoods 
and surrounding communities.‖12 These improvements ―help to 
stabilize neighborhoods, which, in turn, are able to access 
resources to improve schools, support small businesses and 
churches, and build the capacity of community-based 
organizations.‖13 Throughout American history, and most notably 
since Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s New Deal, policymakers have 
tied home ownership to citizenship.
14
 As a result, ―after 1948, the 
national incidence of annual [residential] mobility dropped by 
more than 50 percent; the five-year rate by more than 40 
percent.‖15 Stable homeowner communities were developing 
nationwide.
16
 During this period, residential mobility decreased for 
renters as well as homeowners, but increased home ownership 
                                                        
11 HUD, IDEAS, supra note 7. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at vii. 
14 In their examination of residential mobility, homeownership, and 
citizenship (particularly focused on Riverside, California), Ronald Tobey, 
Charles Wetherell, and Jay Brigham write that President Roosevelt: 
badly wanted to [create federal housing policy to] modernize the 
nation‘s housing stock, not simply in order to improve the quality of 
life for the American people but to engender a revitalized idea of 
citizenship that directly and specifically involved homeownership. 
Although the Lockean notion that citizens should have a property stake 
in society had persisted as a major theme in American political culture 
virtually undiluted since the eighteenth century, it was the sheer power 
of the New Deal state that made possible implementation of the idea. 
Ronald Tobey, Charles Wetherell, & Jay Brigham, Moving Out and Settling In: 
Residential Mobility, Home Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 
1921-1950, 95 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1395, 1395–96 (1990).  
15 Id. at 1402–03. 
16 Id. 
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appears to have directly coincided with the development of 
communities with long-term residents.
17
 Along with home 
ownership, the mortgage industry grew rapidly, culminating in the 
mortgage crisis we see today.
18
 
A. The Roots of the Mortgage Industry and Subprime Lending 
Middle-class homeowners with strong credit have traditionally 
financed home purchases through conventional, ―prime rate‖ 
mortgages.
19
 Prior to the 1980s, these loans were virtually the only 
mortgages available, and they were only granted to individuals 
with strong credit and steady employment.
20
 However, the 
mortgage market changed significantly in the early 1980s as a 
result of deregulation legislation that eliminated state restrictions 
on interest rates and loan payment structures.
21
 For example, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(―DIDMCA‖) of 1980 eliminated state interest rate caps, and the 
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (―AMTPA‖) of 1982 
opened the door for adjustable rate mortgages and balloon payment 
structures.
22
 Additionally, the Tax Reform Act (―TRA‖) of 1986 
made ―high-cost mortgage debt cheaper than consumer debt,‖ thus 
making subprime lending much more profitable.
23
 Subsequently, 
                                                        
17 In addition to increased homeownership and programs developed to 
enable this, other programs developed during the New Deal and postwar period, 
such as rent control, helped to established more stable renter communities. Id. at 
1404–05. 
18 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution 
of the Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, 
January/February 2006, 88(1), 31, 38, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf. 
19 Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking 
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
20 David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allowed 
Predatory Lending To Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 985, 992–93 (2006). 
21 Chomsisengphet &Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 31, 38. 
22 Id. 
23 ―The TRA increased the demand for mortgage debt because it prohibited 
the deduction of interest on consumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions on 
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the subprime market expanded greatly throughout the 1990s.
24
 Due 
to the TRA, borrowers began to use mortgages like regular 
consumer loans, often at the suggestion of lenders, by using equity 
in their home to secure needed cash or consolidate debt.
25
 
Proponents of subprime lending argue that it has expanded 
access to home ownership for low-income communities and 
families with poor credit, but this assertion has been shown to be 
inaccurate due to the high rate of subprime loans on refinance 
mortgages.
26
 Even though ―the rate of minority and low-income 
home ownership has increased over the past decade,‖ this cannot 
be conclusively tied to subprime lending because, according to 
industry data, 82 percent of subprime mortgages were refinances as 
opposed to home purchases.
27
 
B. Defining Subprime Loans and Predatory Lending 
There is no exact standard for establishing which loans are 
―subprime,‖ and the individual lenders determine who falls below 
the credit threshold necessary for a prime loan.
28
 Currently, lenders 
rate the credit risk of potential borrowers using a graded system, 
with ―A‖ as the best possible credit and ―D‖ as the worst.29 Prime 
rate borrowers traditionally have ―A‖ credit, while all others fall 
                                                        
mortgages for a primary residence as well as one additional home.‖ Id. at 38. 
24 Id. 
25 Due to this fact, the vast majority of home mortgages are being used as if 
they were credit cards or personal loans. The only difference is that they are 
secured by the buyer‘s home. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending 
Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 13–14 (Seton Hall 
Public Law Working Paper No. 20, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=594042. 
26 Id. at 11–12. 
27 Results are as of 2004. Id. at 12. 
28 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND 
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, 
CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN 
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 1, 21 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf. 
29 Peterson, supra note 19, at 9. 
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into the subprime category.
30
 Since their inception, subprime loans 
have increased rapidly, and in 2004 they accounted for almost 
twenty percent of furnished loans.
31
 
Subprime loans take on various forms.
32
 However, subprime 
clients are generally deemed to be a greater credit risk due to their 
weaker credit ratings, which disqualify them from prime-rate 
loans. Accordingly, the interest rates on subprime loans are 
inherently higher than on prime loans.
33
 In addition, these loans 
often come with higher points and settlement fees than prime 
loans.
34
 Furthermore, the vast majority of subprime loans are 
refinances of existing debt, as opposed to mortgages used to 
purchase a home.
35
 Another common trend across the subprime 
industry is its target population, as it has disproportionately 
affected communities of color and other vulnerable populations.
36
 
While ―A‖ loans, and as of late, some ―A-‖ loans, have been 
sold by lenders on the secondary market to government-sponsored 
purchasers such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, subprime loans 
                                                        
30 Id. 
31 Reiss, supra note 20, at 994. 
32 These forms include refinances to borrowers with poor credit, loans to 
buyers with credit histories similar to those eligible for ―A‖ loans but with 
limited documentation, and ―high loan-to-value (LTV) refinance mortgages,‖ 
which allow borrowers to take out loans worth nearly as much as, or sometimes 
even more than, their homes. Id. at 995. 
33 Id. 
34 Points and fees are up-front payments, or amounts financed into the loan 
principal, ostensibly to ―compensate for higher origination and servicing costs 
that lenders claim subprime loans have.‖ Id. at 995–96. 
35 Id. at 996. 
36 Professor David Reiss notes that: 
African Americans and Hispanics combined made up less than eight 
percent of the prime home purchase market in 1998, but such 
borrowers made up nearly twenty percent of the subprime home 
purchase mortgage market in that same year. Similarly, African-
American and Hispanic borrowers together make up about six percent 
of all prime conventional refinance mortgages and seventeen percent of 
subprime refinance mortgages. And more than half of all loans in 
predominantly African-American communities are subprime, compared 
to only nine percent in predominantly white communities. 
Reiss, supra note 20, at 997. 
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have a far more varied system of sale to secondary-market 
investors.
37
 In contrast to the manner in which prime loans are 
furnished and sold, subprime loans are generally originated by a 
lender and then are quickly sold in bundles with other subprime 
loans to investors on the secondary market through a process called 
―securitiziation.‖38 Most securitized loans are purchased by 
institutional investors.
39
 Due to securitization, lenders are far more 
willing to furnish borrowers with unaffordable loans because they 
eliminate all risk of loss when they sell the loans to investors.
40
 
When foreclosure occurs, the holder of the loan, as opposed to the 
originator, takes the loss.
41
 Recently, due to mass foreclosures, 
investors on the secondary market have faced huge losses.
42
 
However, some other investors, mostly hedge funds, have 
purchased derivative contracts that have enabled them to make 
                                                        
37 Part of this is due to the higher underwriting requirements of 
government-sponsored buyers. Other secondary-market purchasers have far 
more lax standards. Peterson, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
38 Subprime lenders are frequently not traditional banks or depositary 
institutions, and as such, they frequently borrow money from Wall Street to 
finance their loan transactions. In order to pay Wall Street back, and limit their 
risk of loss (which is particularly high in subprime loans, due to high rates of 
foreclosure), they engage in a process called securitization. Securitization is a 
process in which, after an originator has held the loan for sixty to ninety days, 
the loan is combined with other subprime loans into an aggregate fund, and sold 
to institutional investors. The institutional investor then generally sells shares in 
this fund to individual investors. The originator of the loan uses the funds earned 
from selling the loans to investors to pay back the lenders who provided them 
with the funds to furnish the subprime loan. Patrick Madigan, Memorandum: 
Overview of the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis 5 (Sept. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/predatorylend. 
39 Reiss, supra note 20, at 1002. 
40 When mortgage originators sell loans on the secondary market, the 
investors purchase both the loans and their risk of default, and the lenders 
receive cash for the loans‘ value. Madigan, supra note 38, at 5. 
41 Id. 
42 Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs, three of the nation‘s 
largest investment firms, have lost billions of dollars due to investments in 
securitized subprime loans that have ended up in foreclosure. Bloomberg News, 
Holding of Debt Securities Falls Again at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, 
at C5. See also Associated Press, Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for Two Hedge 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4. 
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money precisely in the situation when loans fail and borrowers go 
into foreclosure.
43
 
Predatory lending and the subprime loan industry go hand in 
hand.
44
 The prime rate market is strictly regulated due to the 
presence of ―such regulated entities as banks and credit unions, as 
well as through robust competition among lenders, more informed 
borrowers and simpler, more homogenous loan terms.‖45 In 
contrast, the subprime market is relatively free of regulation.
46
 
While not all subprime lending is predatory,
47
 virtually all 
predatory lending occurs on subprime loan transactions.
48
 
Predatory lending is a malleable concept,
49
 but can generally be 
defined as deceptive lending practices that are used to prey upon 
unsophisticated and low-income borrowers.
50
 Predatory lenders 
employ numerous practices that are present even in legitimate loan 
transactions, including balloon payments,
51
 adjustable rate 
                                                        
43 This fact has hurt borrowers even more, as it has prevented borrowers 
from modifying bad loans, as the holders of the loans, often hedge funds, want 
them to fail. Madigan, supra note 38, at 7. 
44 Reiss, supra note 20, at 997. 
45 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, 
And the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 571 
(2002). 
46 Id. 
47 Peterson, supra note 19, at 11. 
48 Reiss, supra note 20, at 998. 
49 Bagley, supra note 4, at 2277–78. 
50 Id. See also Eggert, supra note 45, at 507. 
51 The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (―NCRC‖) defines a 
―balloon mortgage‖ as a: 
[t]ype of mortgage loan in which the final payment is significantly 
larger than the payments that are made over the mortgage term. Buyers 
might choose a balloon mortgage if they anticipate refinancing at the 
end of the term, if they have enough money to pay off the loan in a 
lump sum, or if they can afford to buy only because of the 
comparatively smaller monthly payments that may be available with a 
balloon mortgage. 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition Glossary, available at 
http://www.ncrc.org/consumerresources/glossary.php (last visited Sept. 23, 
2008). 
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mortgages (―ARMs‖),52 frequent refinances, and inflated fees and 
interest rates.
53
 These terms are frequently misrepresented by the 
lender and are not properly understood by the borrower, and many 
subprime customers pay fees of over eight percent of the loan 
amount.
54
 In many cases, lenders furnish loans to borrowers with 
no expectation that the borrowers will be able to repay.
55
 As of 
2002, it was estimated that predatory lending cost borrowers in the 
United States $9.1 billion, not including the greatest cost of all—
mortgage foreclosure and loss of their homes.
56
 
Predatory lending schemes frequently involve multiple actors 
in addition to mortgage lenders.
57
 Often, predatory lenders work 
with unethical mortgage brokers to lure consumers into more 
expensive loans with higher interest rates and higher fees paid both 
to the broker and the lender.
58
 In return for these ―services,‖ the 
brokers receive a payment from the lender called a ―yield spread 
premium,‖ which is often concealed by lenders.59 Low-income 
families, immigrants, and people of color are often trapped in these 
                                                        
52 The NCRC defines ―adjustable rate mortgages‖ as mortgages that: 
[U]sually start with a lower interest rate than a fixed-rate mortgage, 
therefore lowering monthly payments. This allows the borrower to 
qualify for a larger mortgage than would be possible with a fixed-rate 
mortgage. The interest rate on an ARM is adjusted periodically based 
on an index that reflects changing market interest rates. When the 
interest rate is adjusted, the monthly payment goes up or down. 
Id. 
53 Eggert, supra note 45, at 513. 
54 Id. at 513–14. 
55 Id. at 515. This is often done through falsification of the borrower‘s 
income by brokers on loan application forms to show a ―higher income or asset 
level.‖ Id. This practice is known as ―equity stripping,‖ as borrowers generally 
go into foreclosure and lose all equity in their homes. Id. 
56 Id. at 507. 
57 Peterson, supra note 19, at 16. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 16–17. A yield spread premium is a payment made directly by the 
lender to the broker, paid out of proceeds from the consumer‘s loan payments. 
Frequently, if a borrower pays a higher rate on his or her loan, the broker who 
steered him or her to the loan will receive a greater yield spread premium from 
the lender. Id. 
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schemes, as they more frequently depend on professionals in 
conducting mortgage transactions.
60
 In response to these multi-
player predatory lending schemes, the federal government and 
numerous states have proposed various laws to prevent abuses by 
many of these parties.
61
 
C. Regulatory Legislation at the Federal Level 
The Federal Government and several state governments have 
proposed diverse solutions to the scourge of predatory lending. The 
Truth-in-Lending Act (―TILA‖) was enacted primarily to ―promote 
the informed use of consumer credit,‖ by providing disclosure 
requirements and remedies for borrowers.
62
 Due to the TILA and 
its more recent amendments, borrowers must be provided with the 
―critical elements of credit cost‖ by their lender, including the 
finance charge, annual interest rate (APR or ―annual percentage 
rate‖), and various other disclosures.63 The TILA differentiates 
―between open-end credit plans [such as credit cards] and closed 
end transactions,‖64 such as mortgages, and mandates additional 
disclosures to and rights for borrowers in closed end transactions.
65
 
                                                        
60 ―Immigrants and minority borrowers are particularly dependent upon real 
estate professionals because they may not speak fluent English or understand the 
complex loan terms and documents, which can certainly confound native 
speakers as well.‖ Vikas Bajaj & Miguel Helft, The Loan That Keeps on Taking, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at C1. Frequently, non-English-speaking borrowers 
sign loan documents in English, at the advice of mortgage brokers and other 
professionals, even though the negotiations related to the mortgage were 
conducted in their native language. All the professionals involved earn 
―lucrative fees.‖ Id. 
61 See infra notes 62–114 and accompanying text. 
62 RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 4 (2000), 4-5; 
15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2007); 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2007). 
63 ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 62, at 4–5; 15 U.S.C. § 1605; 15 U.S.C. § 
1631 (2007). 
64 ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 62, at 4–5. 
65 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2007), 15 U.S.C. § 1631. For open-ended 
consumer credit plans, such as credit cards, creditors must disclose the nature 
and conditions of any finance charges that may be imposed, as well as other 
disclosures related to finance charges, and whether or not any security interest 
has been taken in any of the borrower‘s assets, along with a few other limited 
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In addition to disclosures, the TILA mandates a ―right to cancel‖ or 
rescind for borrowers entering refinance mortgage transactions.
66
 
Under the TILA, lenders must now provide borrowers in all 
mortgage transactions with forms detailing interest rates, total 
payments, pay schedules, and other information important to the 
consumer, both prior to closing and at closing.
67
 
Unfortunately, the success of the TILA depends on very 
informed borrowers, because much of the essential information 
about a mortgage is buried among thousands of pages of form 
contract provisions, discouraging consumers from reading them.
68
 
Generally, consumers simply sign the closing papers.
69
 In addition, 
some brokers and lenders commit outright fraud, making changes 
to documents after they have been signed.
70
 
The TILA is not the only federal law that has been passed in an 
attempt to stop predatory lending. In 1974, Congress passed the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (―RESPA‖),71 which 
prohibits practices by lenders such as kickbacks and referral fees,
72
 
limits the amount that borrowers must place in escrow accounts 
                                                        
disclosures. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2007). For closed-end credit plans like 
mortgages, TILA mandates more expansive disclosures, including: disclosures 
of the amount of actual credit available to the borrower under this transaction; 
the total cost of credit; total payments; the number, amount, and due dates of all 
payments; and other important disclosures essential to understanding the cost of 
credit and the nature of payments. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2007). 
66 Borrowers have up to three business days to rescind the mortgage, 
pursuant to a mandatory notice of right to cancel provided by the lender. 
However, if this notice is not provided, the borrower has up to three years to 
cancel the transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2007). 
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 1638. 
68 See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
70 Chris Arnold, Former Ameriquest Workers Tell of Deception (Morning 
Edition, National Public Radio Broadcast, May 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10165859. 
71 RESPA was amended in 1976. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. (2007). 
72 Kickbacks and referral fees are payments made by lenders to brokers and 
other agents in exchange for no services other than referring a consumer to or 
placing an application with that lender. KENNETH R. REDDEN & JAMES 
MCCLELLAN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER-CREDITOR RELATIONS 102 
(1982). 
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when buying a home, and mandates both additional disclosures of 
settlement costs and a uniform settlement statement.
73
 The RESPA 
was passed with the goal of ensuring that consumers get better and 
more timely information regarding the costs of their transaction 
and are protected from high fees and other abusive lending 
practices.
74
 While the RESPA does mandate uniformity for 
information given to borrowers by lenders and prohibits kickbacks, 
it does little else: it does not set any limits for fees or costs, fails to 
set forth best practices, and fails to develop or mandate any ethical 
standard for lenders or other real estate professionals.
75
 
The strongest federal protection for homebuyers against 
predatory lending is the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act of 1994 (―HOEPA‖).76 The HOEPA provides additional 
protections for borrowers facing ―high-cost‖ loans.77 These are 
home loans in which the APR is eight percentage points over the 
treasury rate on first-lien loans or ten percent above for 
subordinate-lien loans, or those in which points and fees 
amounting to higher than eight percent of the loan‘s principal or 
$400, whichever is greater.
78
 
Under the HOEPA, lenders that trigger the law must provide 
disclosures in addition to those mandated by the TILA, and are 
prevented from including certain terms in their loans, such as 
balloon payments (except for loans spanning less than one year), 
negative amortization, advance payments, increased interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, and due-on-demand clauses.
79
 In effect, the 
law prohibits many practices that are commonly associated with 
predatory lenders for loans that meet the HOEPA trigger interest 
rates or fee amounts.
80
 
Despite being the strongest federal subprime lending regulation 
                                                        
73 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. (2007). 
74 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2007). 
75 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq (2007). 
76 Bagley, supra note 4, at 2280–82; See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2007). 
77 Bagley, supra note 4, at 2280. 
78 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a); ALVIN HARRELL, ED., TRUTH IN LENDING: 
2006 SUPPLEMENT 459 (2006). 
79 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d) (1994). 
80 Id. 
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in existence, the HOEPA has done little to curb predatory 
lending.
81
 Its high triggers have enabled unscrupulous lenders to 
set interest rates, fees, and points just below the HOEPA standards, 
thus exempting them from having to provide HOEPA 
disclosures.
82
 In addition, the HOEPA fails to address ―junk fees‖83 
charged by lenders and the predatory practice of rapid 
refinancing.
84
 Lenders frequently will set their charges just below 
the HOEPA triggers and then aggressively encourage borrowers to 
enter into frequent, unnecessary refinances, extracting fees time 
and again.
85
 The borrowers receive no benefit, and the lenders 
continue to profit.
86
 
A more recent federal law, the Credit Reporting Organizations 
Act (―CROA‖), enacted in 1996, applies to lenders in their 
capacity as credit repair agencies.
87
 The CROA is broader than 
other federal lending legislation, as it prohibits ―any person‖ from 
making or advising consumers to make false or misleading 
statements about credit history or creditworthiness to credit 
agencies and lenders or engaging in any other fraud or deception 
related to their business in credit repair.
88
 The Act also mandates 
additional disclosures by credit repair organizations.
89
 With regard 
to predatory lending, it prohibits lenders or brokers that claim to be 
working to improve a borrower‘s credit rating or creditworthiness 
from misrepresenting that borrower‘s financial information on loan 
applications.
90
 However, the law‘s impact is relatively limited, as it 
                                                        
81 Bagley, supra note 4, at 2282. 
82 Id. 
83 Junk fees are ―unnecessary costs for providing certain . . . services that 
are related to, but technically independent of the mortgage itself.‖ Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 447–
51 (6th ed. 2006). 
88 The Act ―only applies if the [person or] organization uses an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce.‖ Id. at 449; 15 U.S.C. § 1679a (2007); 
15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007). 
89 WU, supra note 87, at 456. 
90 Financial information can include information such as savings, income, 
or anything else that could be used to misrepresent a borrower‘s credit status. Id. 
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only addresses falsification of creditworthiness.
91
 This falsification 
is difficult to prove because lenders can simply claim that they 
received no documents from borrowers, and took them at their 
word regarding statements of their income.
92
 
Finally, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (―ECOA‖) ―prohibits 
treating [any loan] applicant less favorably than other applicants,‖ 
at any stage in the loan process, due to his or her membership in a 
protected class.
93
 The law ostensibly constrains predatory lending 
practices, which have disproportionately affected minority 
homebuyers and other vulnerable communities.
94
 However, by its 
very nature, the ECOA requires predatory lending victims to prove 
that they were targeted, rather than setting strict standards with 
regard to loan terms and conditions.
95
 Therefore, even though it 
prohibits lenders from discriminating against minority borrowers, 
it does nothing to set benchmarks with regard to interest rates or 
                                                        
at 459–60.  
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007). 
92 Press Release, Office of the Att‘y Gen. of Mass., Attorney General 
Martha Coakley Files Lawsuit Against National Mortgage Lender-Fremont 
Investment and Loan (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov (Follow 
Attorney General hyperlink, followed by Press Releases, and then search by 
Title). So-called ―no-doc‖ loans, which require little-to-no documentation of a 
borrower‘s income, are a common form of predatory mortgage. 
93 DEANNE LOONIN & CHI CHI WU, CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 1, 73–74 (3d. 
ed. 2002). 
94 ―Predatory lending campaigns occur not only in the inner-city, but also in 
depressed rural areas, especially including Native American Reservations. Any 
group that is traditionally underserved by mainstream lenders is vulnerable to 
predatory lending. Predatory lenders also gravitate toward the elderly.‖ Peterson, 
supra note 19, at 14. In 2007, a study by New York University‘s Furman Center 
for Real Estate and Policy found substantial discrepancies between the 
percentage of subprime loans furnished in communities of color versus 
predominantly white communities. In New York City, the ten neighborhoods 
with the highest concentration of subprime loans were predominantly black and 
Latino, while the ten neighborhoods with the lowest concentration of these loans 
were predominantly white. The study also revealed that ―even when median 
income levels were comparable, home buyers in minority neighborhoods were 
more likely to get a loan from a subprime lender.‖ Manny Fernandez, Study 
Finds Disparity in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A2. 
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2007).  
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fees, and it is silent with regard to other practices used by 
predatory lenders.
96
 Furthermore, it has been shown that, despite 
the ECOA‘s existence, borrowers of color continue to be 
disproportionately represented in the subprime market.
97
 
While much of this federal regulation appears preventative on 
its face, it has been deceptively ineffective.
98
 Although the TILA 
mandates disclosures, the disclosures are often difficult to read and 
understand, and consumers sometimes do not know they have a 
right to cancel their transactions.
99
 Also, the HOEPA‘s triggers are 
set so high that, despite the law‘s ability to prevent multiple 
predatory practices, lenders can easily evade the act by setting their 
interest rates and fees just below the trigger amounts.
100
 
Furthermore, the CROA is limited to only one element of 
predatory lending—falsification of creditworthiness—which is 
often avoidable.
101
 Finally, regardless of addressing the 
discrimination element, the ECOA has been shown to be 
ineffective through the continuing disproportionate effect of 
predatory lending on communities of color.
102
 
D. State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws and Preemption 
In response to ineffective federal laws, multiple states have 
passed laws to combat unscrupulous lending.
103
 In 1999, North 
Carolina started the trend by passing a law similar to the HOEPA 
that prohibited various predatory contract provisions and sales 
practices.
104
 However, the law set the trigger for fees lower than 
                                                        
96 Id. 
97 See Fernandez, supra note 94.  
98 Miller, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
99 See id.; See also 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2007). 
100 Miller, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
101 15 U.S.C. § 1679b (2007). 
102 Reiss, supra note 20, at 997. 
103 As of 2004, twenty-five states had passed anti-predatory lending laws. 
Peterson, supra note 19, at 5. In addition, twelve cities passed laws of their own 
combating the practice. Id. 
104 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A-10.2 (2003). 
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those of the federal act and included additional prohibitions.
105
 
Numerous states followed suit,
106
 and many municipalities 
developed their own similar ordinances.
107
 State laws in response 
to predatory lending have been touted as highly effective, as states 
have been better able to innovate and respond to constituents and 
local needs.
108
 
However, due to an outcry from the lending industry, the 
federal government has undercut such regulation by issuing 
statements declaring that federal banking law preempts state action 
with regard to federally-chartered, FDIC-insured banks.
109
 
Beginning in 2003, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
(―OCC‖), a federal agency, issued a series of orders preempting 
various state predatory lending statutes as applied to national 
banks, despite the vigorous objection of State Attorneys General 
across the country.
110
 This preemption has prevented states from 
developing new legislation and utilizing creative solutions to stop 
the scourge of predatory lending.
111
 Consequently, aside from state 
consumer protection acts and fraud claims, states and consumers 
generally have been forced to depend on federal legislation.
112
 
                                                        
105 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (1994); § 24-1.1A-10.2; Peterson, supra note 19, 
at 62–63. The North Carolina Predatory Lending Act of 1999 prohibited 
practices such as balloon payments, negative amortization and others, but unlike 
HOEPA, it set its fee trigger at five percent, as opposed to HOEPA‘s eight 
percent. Peterson, supra note 19, at 62–63. It maintained an interest rate trigger 
of ten percent above the rate on comparable U.S. Treasury securities. Id. In 
addition, unlike HOEPA, it prohibited rapid refinancing and furnishing loans 
without regard to a borrower‘s ability to repay. Id. 
106 ―Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Massachusetts . . . 
all adopted strong predatory lending laws echoing the North Carolina approach.‖ 
Id. at 65–66. Georgia passed a strong law and then repealed it, and multiple 
other states have passed anti-predatory lending and consumer protection laws 
that ostensibly protect consumers, but are not nearly as strong. Id. at 65–67. 
107 Peterson, supra note 19, at 64–65. 
108 Azmy, supra note 25, at 5. 
109 Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
110 The OCC claimed that ―state laws do not apply to national banks 
whenever they ‗obstruct, impair, or condition‘ the ability of national banks to 
engage in consumer lending.‖ Id. at 70. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
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Therefore, due to weak federal regulation and preemption of state 
laws, states and others interested in combating predatory lending 
have had to utilize other methods to prevent unethical lending 
practices.
113
 The primary method has been in the form of suits filed 
by state Attorneys General on behalf of aggrieved consumers.
114
 
II. STATE ACTION AND ATTORNEY GENERAL-DIRECTED LAWSUITS 
Federal preemption of state predatory lending laws has left 
states with few options.
115
 In response, state Attorneys General 
have filed numerous lawsuits against large predatory lenders, often 
relying on state unfair and deceptive acts and practices (―UDAP‖) 
laws and fraud claims.
116
 
A. The Household Finance and Ameriquest Suits 
In December 2002, Tom Miller, the Iowa Attorney General and 
Chair of the Subprime Lending Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General, along with the Attorneys 
General of every other state, reached a settlement with Household 
Finance Corporation and Beneficial Corporation (―Household‖), a 
subprime, predatory lender.
117
 Under the terms of the settlement, 
                                                        
113 Id. 
114 See infra notes 117–55 and accompanying text. 
115 Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
116 See infra notes 117–55 and accompanying text. 
117 Press Release, Office of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., Miller: All Fifty States 
Join Settlement with Household Finance (Dec. 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhold.html. 
This settlement between the State of Iowa and Household Finance is 
substantially the same as settlements between Household and the forty-nine 
other states and the District of Columbia. Id. The settlement identified numerous 
predatory practices by Household, including but not limited to the following: 
interest rates, points and origination fees, monthly payment amounts, balloon 
payments, prepayment penalties, limited documentation, and rapid refinancing 
without benefit to the consumer. Id. In Iowa, the State‘s suit was based upon the 
claim that Household had violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, Iowa Code 
Sec. 714.16. Settlement Consent Agreement 4, available at 
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhconsent.p
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Household agreed to pay out $484 million to aggrieved consumers 
across the country.
118
 However, while Household paid hundreds of 
millions of dollars into a restitution fund, defrauded borrowers 
received minimal proceeds.
119
 Often, victims of predatory lending 
are thousands of dollars in debt, so the restitution received by each 
victim in the Household settlement was likely only a fraction of the 
amount owed.
120
 
However, in addition to the settlement fund set up by 
Household,
121
 the settlement called for restitution of some 
prepayment penalties paid by consumers
122
 and multiple forms of 
injunctive relief.
123
 After this suit, Household‘s lender fees were 
limited to five percent of the loan principal,
124
 and the lender had 
to provide disclosure regarding calculation of points, interest rates, 
                                                        
df (last visited July 27, 2008). 
118 Miller: All Fifty States Join Settlement Agreement, supra note 117. 
119 Press Release, Office of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., 1.5 Million on its Way to 
Household Finance Customers (Dec. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.org/latest_news/releases/dec_2003/household.h
tml. For example, Iowa received approximately $1.5 million of the $484 million 
restitution fund. Id. However, this was split among 2,886 households, such that 
most Household borrowers in Iowa received between $100 and $500 in 
restitution, and no borrower received more than $5,768. Id. 
120 Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2007, at C1. Frequently, predatory lending victims have fallen behind 
on their loans by thousands of dollars. Id. For example, Sharon Rivas-Spivey, a 
borrower from southern New Jersey, has seen her $141,000 loan increase to over 
$196,000 due to rising interest, late fees and other charges. Id. Jane Connor, a 
Massachusetts borrower, owes over $550,000 for a loan on which she owed 
approximately $442,000 when she went into default. Id. These borrowers, who 
both received loans from Countrywide Mortgage, are not uncommon. Id. 
121 The money paid by Household would primarily be distributed via an 
interest-bearing trust administered in California by the Office of the California 
Attorney General, and through other settlement accounts for states not 
participating in this fund. See Settlement Consent Agreement, supra note 117, at 
7. 
122 Id. at 9–10. 
123 Id. at 10–20. 
124 Id. at 11. These fees are referring to ―loan origination charges, Discount 
Points, or both.‖ Id. 
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and balloon payments.
125
 Further, Household had to provide a 
good faith estimate of all charges to be incurred by a potential 
borrower, no later than three days after the prospective borrower‘s 
application had been delivered, and could not represent its interest 
rates or any loan terms in a ―deceptive manner.‖126 In addition, 
Household was prohibited from charging prepayment penalties on 
any loans (without making disclosures), charging discount points 
or origination fees on any mortgages that had been refinanced or 
originated by Household in the previous twelve months, and 
selling credit insurance on mortgages.
127
 Borrowers had the right to 
cancel all open-ended lines of credit furnished by Household at any 
time.
128
 
While the restitutionary funds provided for consumers in the 
Household settlement were minimal, the injunctive relief secured 
by the states was substantial, as it limited Household‘s ability to 
use deceptive practices and charge exorbitant rates to unwitting 
consumers.
129
 However, the settlement and its injunctive 
provisions only applied to Household, and numerous other 
predatory lenders continued to prey upon homeowners throughout 
the country. 
Following the Household case, forty-nine state Attorneys 
General and the Attorney General of the District of Columbia 
followed suit and in 2006, instituted proceedings against 
Ameriquest, another large subprime lender.
130
 This suit netted 
$325 million, with $295 million going to the lender‘s victims and 
$30 million paying for legal costs.
131
 Like the Household 
settlement, the Ameriquest settlement called for injunctive relief, 
                                                        
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 11–12. 
127 Id. at 16–17. 
128 Id. at 15.  
129 See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text. 
130 Press Release, State of N.Y. Banking Dep‘t, Banking Department Joins 
Regulators and Law Enforcement Officials from 48 Other States in Announcing 
Settlement Agreement With Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Jan. 23, 2006), 
available at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr060123.htm. 
131 Ameriquest to Pay $325 Million in a Settlement Over Lending, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at C1. 
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requiring Ameriquest to provide the same interest rates and 
discount points for ―similarly-situated consumers,‖ to eliminate the 
use of incentives for employees to charge consumers extra fees or 
prepayment penalties, to provide full disclosure of the cost and 
terms of the loan, to provide accurate, good-faith estimates, to limit 
prepayment penalties on adjustable rate mortgages, and to institute 
many other changes to the company practice.
132
 However, state 
officials have also engaged in other activities, aside from suing 
major lenders, in an effort to stop predatory lending.
133
 
B. More State Action and the Push for Substantive Change 
A developing trend is state agencies suing other lenders, such 
as Delta Financial,
134
 Advantage Mortgage Service,
135
 and First 
Alliance Mortgage Company.
136
 However, each of these suits has 
led to a settlement that applies only to the specific lender that was 
sued. As a result, there has not been industry-wide change, since 
settlements bind only the parties involved, and do not establish 
precedent. 
State Attorneys General and other state officials have 
                                                        
132 See Press Release, State of N.Y. Banking Dep‘t, supra note 130. 
133 See infra notes 134–55 and accompanying text. 
134 Delta Financial Corporation settled for $1.65 million in 2002, with 
$500,000 going to defrauded consumers. Joseph P. Fried, Home Lender Offers 
to Settle Claims of Predatory Practices, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at B3. 
135 The State of Nebraska sued Advantage Mortgage Services, a mortgage 
lender, for violation of ―Nebraska‘s Mortgage Bankers Registration and 
Licensing Act, the Consumer Protection Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act.‖ Nelson Lampe, Nebraska Sues Mortgage Broker for Predatory 
Lending, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2007-09-14-nebraska-
mortgage-suit_N.htm. Advantage originates more than $100 million in loans per 
year. Id. 
136 Minnesota successfully sued First Alliance in 1999 for its ―teaser‖ 
ARMs, which led Minnesota consumers to purchase unaffordable loans. Lori 
Swanson, Att. Gen., St. of Minn., Testimony to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (June 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/Consumer/SwansonTestimonyFederal%20Reser
ve.pdf. 
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continued to take actions designed to combat lending abuses.
137
 In 
addition to suing predatory lenders, they have pushed for federal 
legislative change and regulation to prevent mass foreclosure.
138
 A 
task force, led by Miller and comprised of Attorneys General and 
banking regulators from ten states, has begun working to ―persuade 
mortgage-servicing companies and investors in mortgage-backed 
securities to increase the number of troubled subprime loans they 
restructure, to stem the tide of foreclosures.‖139 The task force is 
working with banks to collaboratively address skyrocketing rates 
of foreclosure, pursuing this new tactic in lieu of enforcement 
actions.
140
 
In addition, the task force is pushing for federal legislative 
action.
141
 In August 2007, Miller addressed the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, and argued that HOEPA should be amended 
to incorporate various regulations to prohibit numerous ―unfair and 
deceptive practices.‖142 Building upon the success of the 
Household and Ameriquest suits, Miller claimed that the 
settlements helped state governments develop the expertise 
necessary to stop predatory lending, and led the lenders to establish 
better practices that had been adopted by others in the mortgage 
industry.
143
 He emphasized that the Federal Reserve Board was in 
a unique position to address the preemption issue and develop 
regulations that would apply to all members of the mortgage 
lending community and establish uniform standards of conduct.
144
 
                                                        
137 See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text. 
139 Ruth Simon, Task Force Will Seek More Loan Revisions, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 8, 2007, at A3. 
140 Id. 
141 Press Release, Iowa Office of the Att‘y. Gen., Iowa Attorney General 
Tom Miller Comments to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors on Adopting 
Regulations to Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices under the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) (August 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/aug_ 
2007/Fed_reserve_hoepa.html. 
142 Id. 
143 Miller, supra note 9. 
144 Id. at 2. 
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Additionally, Miller echoed the sentiment that HOEPA, in its 
present form, has been somewhat useful, but overall ineffective 
because it has only applied to the limited category of ―high-cost‖ 
loans.
145
 He stated, ―[a]fter all, the problems [that] the States 
uncovered in the Household and Ameriquest cases did not involve 
high cost loans (as defined under HOEPA), but regular subprime 
loans.‖146 In addition, he acknowledged that existing disclosure 
documents provided to consumers were inadequate, but that 
improved disclosures alone would not suffice to stop predatory 
lending.
147
 Miller also argued for a new underwriting standard for 
subprime loans, based upon the borrower‘s ability to repay the 
loan, instead of his or her ability to pay off low teaser rates on 
adjustable rate mortgages and the possibility of market 
appreciation.
148
 Further, he suggested prohibiting prepayment 
penalties for subprime loans
149
 and other concessions from the 
mortgage industry.
150
 
                                                        
145 Id. at 3. 
146 Id. 
147 ―No matter how good the disclosure, it will always be subject to 
misrepresentations, omissions, and downright lying by a loan originator who has 
every incentive to close the loan. Subprime originators have a propensity to 
engage in deception and misrepresentations which undermine even the best 
disclosures.‖ Id. at 4. 
148 A teaser rate is an introductory interest rate that adjusts upward rapidly 
as part of an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). Investopedia.com, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/teaserrate.asp. Low teaser rates often get 
homebuyers into homes, but make foreclosure almost inevitable. While market 
appreciation will make the house easier to sell for greater value in the future, it 
will not help a homeowner make his or her monthly mortgage payments. In 
order to make payments, homeowners frequently have to refinance, often ending 
up in more oppressive loans. See Miller, supra note 9, at 4–7. 
149 Miller, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
150 These additional requests included requiring escrow accounts for taxes 
and insurance, as lenders frequently leave taxes and insurance out of their 
monthly payment quotes to borrowers, leading them to believe payments will be 
lower than they actually are. Id. at 9. This is especially prevalent on loan 
transactions in which a borrower is refinancing a current loan and consolidating 
debt into a mortgage. Id. Miller also suggested restrictions on ―low-doc‖ loans, 
which frequently allow lenders to furnish unaffordable loans, as lenders can 
claim they furnished the loan based on the borrower‘s stated income and no 
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In addition to the actions of Miller and the task force, other 
state officials have similarly pushed for change in how lenders 
relate to investors who purchase mortgages on the secondary 
market.
151
 Since securitization has eliminated much of the risk of 
loss for subprime lenders and has eliminated the risk of liability for 
both lenders and investors,
152
 policymakers have called for its 
regulation.
153
 
These combined tactics, by which state officials have worked 
with banks while pushing for legislative change, are built upon the 
litigation strategy previously used by the states, and are being used 
to supplement the impact of the litigation. This new strategy seems 
tailored to fit the current foreclosure crisis and the numerous 
parties involved in and affected by it. 
State-directed lawsuits alone were not effective at creating 
systemic change and reforming the entire subprime market.
154
 
However, they were the best tool available to fight predatory 
lenders, given the then-existing federal laws and their preemption 
of state legislative action.
155
 In addition, they provided valuable 
information and lessons to state officials, enabling officials to 
make well-grounded policy recommendations to the federal 
government and to work with the industry itself to combat abusive 
                                                        
additional documentation, Id. at 10–11. Further, he recommends prohibition of 
future promises to refinance, as these frequently are made to convince borrowers 
who have discovered a ―bait-and-switch‖ at closing to enter bad loans, thinking 
they will soon refinance into a better one that never actually happens. Id. at 12. 
Miller‘s comments supported those made to the Federal Reserve Board by 
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson, when in June 2007, she argued for 
aggressive enforcement and expansion of HOEPA and against federal 
preemption of state consumer protection laws. Swanson, supra note 136, at 3–6. 
151 See, e.g., Madigan, supra note 38, at 5–6. 
152 Investors have generally not been held liable for the actions of a loan 
originator, and once the originator sells the loan through securitization, the 
originator‘s risk of loss is gone, because it has been paid in full by investors. 
Therefore, subprime lenders are far more willing to engage in predatory 
practices and furnish unaffordable loans, as all risk of default is passed along to 
the secondary market. Id. at 5–6. 
153 Id. at 9–11. 
154 See supra notes 117–33 and accompanying text. 
155 See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
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practices. 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS‘ GENERAL ACTION 
While the suits against individual lenders exerted limited 
systemic impact, they have provided a framework and an 
opportunity for developing broad policy change in the future. 
A.  The Influence of the Banking Industry 
The banking industry, including the mortgage lending industry, 
has wielded important influence over politicians in both major 
parties through its political donations and support of candidates.
156
 
Providing substantial financial support for politicians and parties 
can buy an industry significant influence over legislation and 
federal policy.
157
 Since 1990, the mortgage industry has donated 
over $45 million to federal politicians, with fifty-six percent going 
to Republicans and forty-four percent to Democrats.
158
 Also, since 
1990, the securities and investment sector, which is closely tied to 
the mortgage industry due to securitization, has contributed $473 
                                                        
156 See Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
industries/indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008). 
157 This effect has been demonstrated by the tobacco industry and its 
ongoing lobbying efforts. See Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry 
Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 902, BULL. OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 78.7 (July 2000). According to the World Health Organization, 
throughout its history, the tobacco industry used multiple methods to block 
legislation hostile to its interests. Prominent among these methods was buying 
influence through gifts to politicians, such as ―dinners and tickets to sports 
events like the Indianapolis 500.‖ Id. at 905. This was in addition to political 
donations and other financial contributions. In 1998, in the United States alone, 
the industry spent over $43 million on lobbying against federal anti-tobacco 
legislation. Id. at 906. 
158 This amount includes both soft money and hard money contributions, 
according to opensecrets.org, the website of the Center for Responsive Politics, 
which tracks political donations from individuals, companies, and industrial 
sectors. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ 
indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008). During the 2004 election 
cycle, the industry provided close to $8 million in political contributions, with 
64 percent going to Republicans and the rest to Democrats. Id. 
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million to both major parties, with fifty-one percent going to 
Republicans and forty-eight percent to Democrats.
159
 Due to the 
political power inherent in the banking industry, this continuing 
influence will remain an inhibiting force on any type of federal 
reform on the mortgage banking industry.
160
 
B.  Valuable Lessons for the Future 
Despite the power of the mortgage industry and the securities 
sector, state officials have been able to glean multiple important 
lessons from their prior efforts, which have informed more recent 
action and will likely continue to do so going forward. Prior to the 
burst of the housing bubble and the collapse of the subprime 
market, state-directed lawsuits led by the Attorneys General were 
the only feasible actions that could be taken.
161
 The states 
attempted to stop large predatory lenders by using consumer 
protection and fraud statutes, since these were the few weapons 
that were at their disposal.
162
 While this strategy established little 
substantive change and provided only minimal compensation for 
victims, Attorneys General were successful in changing certain 
practices of one major predatory lender, Ameriquest, and virtually 
shut down another lender, Household.
163
 HSBC, which purchased 
Household, now funds the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition‘s ―Consumer Rescue Fund,‖ which provides low-interest 
                                                        
159 Ctr. for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus. 
asp?Ind=F07 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008). 
160 Stephen Labaton, Loan Industry Fighting Rules on Mortgages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, at A1. 
161 Federal preemption of state law eliminated states‘ abilities to develop 
comprehensive anti-predatory lending statutes, Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–
71. Therefore, state Attorneys General brought suits on behalf of victimized 
borrowers based on state UDAP statutes. Complaint against Household 
Fin.Corp., Of. of the Iowa Att‘y. Gen., available at http://www.state.ia.us/ 
government/ag/latest_news/releases/dec_2002/hhpetition.pdf. 
162 Id. 
163 Household Finance was purchased by HSBC in 2003, which settled its 
above-mentioned lawsuit. Julia Werdigier, Two Executives Are Ousted at HSBC, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C1. 
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loans for victims of predatory lending.
164
 This is a positive 
development for aggrieved borrowers—with the federal 
government hesitant to provide support for subprime borrowers 
over the past several years,
165
 this was the best result for which 
anti-predatory lending advocates could have hoped. 
Nonetheless, predatory lending has continued to thrive through 
a large network of lenders, brokers, and other unscrupulous real 
estate professionals.
166
 Lenders provide ―yield spread premiums,‖ 
which are special bonuses to brokers who steer consumers into 
more expensive loans.
167
 In addition, lenders sometimes bring 
lawyers to closings, who purportedly represent the borrowers‘ 
interests.
168
 Instead, these lawyers frequently serve the interest of 
the brokers or lenders, and the borrowers rarely have the chance to 
read through their loan documents at that time.
169
 Further, 
                                                        
164 Sue Kirchhoff, More U.S. Home Buyers Fall Prey To Predatory 
Lending, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
money/perfi/housing/2004-12-06-subprime-predatory-lending_x.htm. The 
Consumer Rescue Fund, developed by the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition, was developed to prevent homeowners, facing foreclosure, from 
losing their homes. It provides multiple forms of support for victims of 
predatory lending, including mediation with the lender or holder of the loan to 
eliminate abusive loan terms, refinancing into a fair, affordable loan through the 
lender or servicer, or, in some cases, forgiving unaffordable portions of the loan. 
The Consumer Rescue Fund provides refinancing services in seventeen states. 
NCRC Consumer Rescue Fund, www.fairlending.com (last visited Sept. 24, 
2008) (providing a more in-depth description of the Consumer Rescue Fund and 
its terms and conditions). 
165 The federal government has undercut state attempts to protect 
consumers via federal preemption of state predatory lending laws. See Peterson, 
supra note 19, at 70–71. 
166 Bajaj, supra note 60. Frequently, predatory lenders will work with 
attorneys, title companies, brokers, and other professionals who use unethical 
tactics to steer borrowers toward inflated, bogus charges and unaffordable loans. 
Telephone Interview with Margaret Becker, Dir., Foreclosure Prevention Unit at 
Legal Services for N.Y. City – Staten Island, (Dec. 4, 2007), hereinafter ―Becker 
Interview‖. See generally ELIZABETH RENUART, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A 
GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES (2002). 
167 Peterson, supra note 19, at 16–17. 
168 Becker Interview, supra note 166 
169 Id. 
COLLINS 4/16/2009  4:17 PM 
258 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
predatory lenders often work with title agencies that charge 
inflated prices and bogus fees for their services.
170
 
C.  Out of Crisis Comes an Opportunity for Change 
The collapse of the subprime market and rapidly increasing 
rates of foreclosure have appeared prominently in the news 
throughout 2007 and 2008.
171
 Predatory lending‘s impact is 
affecting a segment of America beyond subprime borrowers, 
including investors, the media, the political sector, and the public 
at-large.
172
 At this time, there is a unique opportunity to develop 
substantive change at both the state and federal level, based upon 
the prior successes of the State Attorneys General in pursuing 
predatory lenders and attempting to change their practices.
173
 
i. The Ripple Effect of a Collapsing Industry 
The casualties of the subprime industry did not end with 
Ameriquest or Household. Instead, the collapsing subprime 
industry has contributed to a nationwide economic downturn.
174
 
Countrywide Mortgage was a major casualty in the ―subprime 
crisis.‖175 As of September 7, 2007, the lender had announced 
plans to cut 12,000 of its approximately 60,000 employees, nearly 
20 percent of its workforce.
176
 Countrywide has been an influential 
party in subprime lending, with numerous accusations of predatory 
                                                        
170 Id. From personal experience at Legal Services for New York City – 
Staten Island during the summer of 2007, I observed loan documents outlining 
charges for numerous predatory loans. On these documents, I saw the same title 
agencies appear time and again, charging high fees to clients and repeatedly 
doing business with predatory lenders. Id. 
171 See sources cited supra note 1. 
172 See discussion infra notes 174–89 and accompanying text. 
173 See discussion supra notes 115–55 and accompanying text. 
174 Peter S. Goodman & Floyd Norris, No Quick Fix to Downturn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at A1. 
175 Eric Dash, Countrywide Plans to Cut Staff Deeply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2007, at C1. 
176 Id. 
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activity.
177
 In April 2007, Countrywide settled with the State of 
Connecticut for $500,000 because of its predatory practices.
178
 
More recently, based upon its exposure to 80,000 potential 
foreclosures due to resetting interest rates on ARMs, Countrywide 
has agreed to refinance up to $16 billion in loans.
179
 As of October 
2007, 450,000 of the nine million loans serviced by Countrywide 
were at least a month late on payments, and at least 80,000 were 
facing foreclosure.
180
 Countrywide serves as an example of a large-
scale subprime lender whose engagement in predatory lending has 
harmed the company itself, forcing it to refinance billions of 
dollars in loans and lay off thousands of workers.
181
 Countrywide‘s 
collapse serves to illustrate the impact predatory lending has had 
on not just borrowers, but on workers, renters,
182
 and investors as 
well.
183
 By engaging in unscrupulous practices, Countrywide has 
                                                        
177 See Bob Tedeschi, When State Laws Do Not Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2007, at RE11. 
178 Id. 
179 Countrywide had identified 80,000 potential borrowers who had been 
able to make payments at their current interest rates, but were scheduled to face 
a rate adjustment that would make their loans unaffordable. Countrywide Offers 
Help for Reset Shock, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 23, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/23/news/companies/countrywide_default_progra
m/. According to Countrywide, 52,000 of these customers, representing 
approximately $10 billion in loans, will qualify for either prime rate loans or 
loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (―FHA‖). Id. An 
additional 20,000 borrowers, currently meeting payments, but with more severe 
credit problems, could receive other loan modifications totaling $4 billion 
dollars.  Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Dash, supra note 175. 
182 In addition to the subprime collapse‘s impact on employees at 
Countrywide, renters have faced eviction from properties in foreclosure. See 
Dash, supra note 175. For example, in Nevada, 28 percent of foreclosed-upon 
properties were home to renters, as were 22 percent of foreclosed-upon 
properties in California. Thus, these individuals, who never interacted directly 
with a predatory lender or broker, are feeling the unfortunate effects of mass 
foreclosure. John Leland, As Owners Feel Mortgage Pain, So Do Renters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1; see also Kelly Evans, Mortgage Turmoil Hits 
Renters, WALL ST. J., at D1, Oct. 11, 2007. 
183 Some hedge funds and other investment firms have faced huge losses, 
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put a massive number of people at risk. 
The crises faced by Countrywide and other lenders have 
increasingly caused market-wide problems throughout the United 
States economy.
184
 In addition, the mortgage crisis has hurt renters, 
as landlords have fallen behind on mortgage payments and faced 
foreclosure.
185
 Recently, additional important actors in the 
subprime industry have faced similar fates, and the impact has 
even spread to more traditional lenders.
186
 In the summer of 2008, 
government-supported mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac had to rely on a federal bail-out, due to a downward spiral in 
the economy.
187
 Further, the general public has faced significant 
financial losses due to investment in subprime loans,
188
 as have 
major American banks.
189
 
ii.  An Opportunity for Discussion and Ideas for the Future 
The subprime crisis has finally forced state and federal officials 
to consider the importance of preventing foreclosure and the abuse 
                                                        
and have even filed for bankruptcy, based on losses due to investment in the 
subprime market. See Associated Press, Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for Two 
Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4; see also Bloomberg News, 
Holding of Debt Securities Falls Again at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, 
at C5. 
184 Bank of America, for example, reported that, ―net income fell 32 
percent, as it set aside an additional $865 million for credit losses and 
announced that loans that have gone bad rose by nearly $1 billion.‖ Countrywide 
Offers Help for Reset Shock, supra note 179. 
185 Evans, supra note 182. 
186 Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game – What Will Mac ‘n’ Mae Cost You 
and Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at BU1.  
187 Id. 
188 See supra notes 182–84. 
189 For example, Citigroup announced the departure of its Chairman and 
CEO as it faced potential writedowns (reductions in the book value of 
overvalued assets) of up to $11 million. Citigroup’s Day of Reckoning, 
CNNMoney.com, Nov. 4, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/04/news/ 
companies/citigroup_prince/. Less than a week earlier, the CEO of Merrill 
Lynch also resigned, due to severe losses stemming from investments in the 
subprime market. David Ellis, O’Neal Out at Merrill, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 31, 
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/30/news/companies/merrill_oneal/. 
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of borrowers and investors by subprime lenders and the 
organizations with whom they do business.
190
 The federal 
government has seized this opportunity, leveraging knowledge 
gained from state-directed lawsuits and other strategies around 
predatory lending to develop new legislation aimed at combating 
abusive lending practices.
191
 In particular, Congress has recently 
been pushing the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act of 2007, also known as House Bill 3915,
192
 a bill designed to 
regulate subprime lenders and to prevent the abuses that have 
injured consumers and affected the entire market.
193
 Most notably, 
the bill mandates that lenders not furnish loans without regard to a 
borrower‘s ability to repay.194 It also addresses disclosures, yield 
spread premiums, and various other tactics used by predatory 
lenders.
195
 In addition, it deals with elements of predatory lending 
                                                        
190 See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Enron’s Second Coming?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2007, at A25. 
191 See Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2007, at A24; see also Miller, supra note 9, at 1. 
192 Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 
3915, 110th Cong. (2007). According to the office of Congressman Christopher 
Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut, the bill (among other things):  
1) Establishes a federal duty of care, prohibits steering, and calls for 
licensing and registration of mortgage originators, including brokers 
and bank loan officers; 2) Sets a minimum standard for all mortgages 
which states that borrowers must have a reasonable ability to repay; 3) 
Attaches limited liability to secondary market securitizers who package 
and sell interest in home mortgage loans outside of these standards. 
However, individual investors in these securities would not be liable; 
and 4) Expands and enhances consumer protections for ―high-cost 
loans‖ under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and 
includes important protections for renters of foreclosed homes. 
Press Release, Office of Representative Christopher Murphy, Murphy 
Successful in Moving Mortgage Kickback Prohibition Bill, October 23, 2007, 
available at http://chrismurphy.house.gov/ (follow ―latest news,‖ hyperlink; then 
follow hyperlink for Oct. 23, 2007). 
193 Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191. 
194 Id. 
195 House Bill 3915 § 129A establishes a general standard of care to be 
followed by lenders, and lists mandatory disclosures. H.R. Res. 3915 § 129A. 
Section 123 of this resolution prohibits yield spread premiums based upon the 
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that are ignored by existing statutes, such as TILA and HOEPA.
196
 
Further, it explicitly prevents federal preemption of state banking 
laws.
197
  
Notwithstanding these characteristics, the bill provides only 
limited means for redress for aggrieved consumers.
198
 A major 
example of this is the bill‘s treatment of assignee (secondary-
market investor) liability.
199
 With regard to companies who 
                                                        
terms of the loan and other forms of ―steering‖ consumers towards higher-cost 
loans. H.R. Res. 3915 § 123. Section 103 sets forth licensing and registration 
regulations for lenders. H.R. Res. 3915 § 103. This federal regulation is directly 
in line with Attorney General Miller‘s request for federal intervention, based 
upon his experience in the Ameriquest suit and his involvement with the ten-
state task force. See generally Miller, supra note 9. 
196 TILA purely addresses disclosures, See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2008). 
HOEPA does not address junk fees, rapid refinancing, or furnishing loans 
without regard to repayment ability. Bagley, supra note 4 at 2282. House Bill 
3915 closes these loopholes. See H.R. Res. 3915, § 201 et. seq. (2007) 
197 See H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(b) (2007). The statute does indicate that TILA 
supersedes any state law with which it conflicts. See H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(a). 
However, Section 208(b) states that, aside from that one provision, the law in no 
way limits the states from applying any state law against a creditor, assignee or 
securitizer. H.R. Res. 3915 § 208(b) (2008). 
198 Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, 
at A28.  
199 The Act provides that aggrieved borrowers can receive only limited 
remedies from securitizers, including rescission of the loan and all costs that 
occur in conjunction with this rescission, including attorney‘s fees. However, 
the securitizer can remain exempt from all liability if it cures the mortgage‘s 
flaws or if the following conditions are met: 
(i)   The assignee [or securitizer] -- 
(I) has a policy against buying residential mortgage loans 
other than  qualified mortgages or qualified safe harbor 
mortgages (as defined in subsection (c)); and 
(II) exercises reasonable due diligence to adhere to such policy 
in purchasing residential mortgage loans through adequate, 
thorough, and consistently applied sampling procedures 
established in accordance which regulations which the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation shall jointly prescribe. 
(ii) The contract under which such assignee acquired the residential 
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purchase loans on the secondary market, aggrieved borrowers can 
only have the loan rescinded and receive restitution for any costs 
incurred dealing with this rescission.
200
 Furthermore, assignees and 
securitizers are even protected from this limited liability if they 
meet certain conditions—namely that they have policies and 
practices in place that prevent the furnishing of unaffordable 
mortgages.
201
 This limitation on liability leaves borrowers virtually 
powerless once their loans have been securitized and sold, because 
there is no legal mechanism to force secondary-market actors to 
behave ethically with regard to purchasing loans.
202
 
Unfortunately, in addition to these substantial limitations, 
Congress has proposed amendments to H.R. 3915 that weakened it 
further.
203
 One such amendment would eliminate any means for 
redress under the law at the state level, rendering the section 
preventing federal preemption of state predatory lending regulation 
functionally meaningless.
204
 Much of the blame has been placed on 
the banking industry‘s influence on both parties in Congress, as the 
banking industry has extensive lobbying power and the ability to 
donate large sums to candidates.
205
 Despite these weaknesses, 
though, H.R. 3915 still remains a tougher federal anti-predatory 
lending law than those that are already in existence.
206
 While the 
                                                        
mortgage loan from a seller or assignor of the loan contains 
representations and warranties that the seller or assignor-- 
(I) will not sell or assign any residential mortgage loan which 
is not a qualified mortgage or a qualified safe harbor 
mortgage; or 
(II) is a beneficiary of a representation and warranty from a 
previous seller or assignor to that effect, and the assignee in  
good faith takes reasonable steps to obtain the benefit of such 
representation or warranty. 
H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007) § 204. 
200 Id.  
201 Id. 
202 The only risk is the risk of rescission. Id. 
203 Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 See supra notes 62–102 and accompanying text. 
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resolution is evidence that the federal government is at least 
considering taking a small step to protect borrowers, that 
protection will not arrive until the bill passes the Senate.
207
 
iii. Potential Solutions 
There are a wide range of potential options for preventing 
predatory lending in the future and rectifying the lending abuses 
that have already occurred. While H.R. 3915, in its original form, 
addressed some of the suggestions of Attorney General Miller and 
his task force,
208
 there are still additional means to address abuses 
in the subprime market. These options include: (1) more 
comprehensive federal policy change;
209
 (2) allowing states more 
leeway in developing their own anti-predatory lending programs 
and statutes;
210
 (3) Attorneys General continuing to pursue abuses 
in the subprime market, focusing on rating agencies in addition to 
lenders;
211
 and (4) campaign finance reform, curbing the banking 
industry‘s influence on the political process.212 
There is ample opportunity and desire for change at the federal 
level.
213
 As evidenced by the development of H.R. 3915 and the 
                                                        
207 GovTrack.us, H.R. 3915: Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act of 2007, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-
3915 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). 
208 Miller has suggested more stringent regulations that would apply to a 
broader class of loans than the HOEPA; that merely improved disclosure 
standards would not be enough to prevent predatory lending; that loans should 
be furnished based upon a standard for a borrower‘s ability to repay; that 
prepayment penalties should be eliminated; and other policy recommendations. 
See Miller, supra note 9, at 1. H.R. 3915 has adopted many of these 
recommendations, but has failed to provide necessary enforcement mechanisms, 
particularly with regard to secondary-market investor liability See H.R 3915; 
supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
209 See infra notes 213–25 and accompanying text. 
210 See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
211 See infra notes 226–31 and accompanying text. 
212 See Editorial, Candidates Bungle With Bundlers, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2007, at 8. 
213 See Murphy, supra note 192; see also Press Release, Office of 
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Tubbs Jones Releases Statement in 
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high levels of publicity associated with the Ameriquest and 
Household suits,
214
 the public has finally recognized the need for 
strict federal laws to regulate subprime lenders.
215
 The federal 
government has attempted to make some policy changes based 
upon Attorney General Miller‘s suggestions.216 Most notably, H.R. 
3915 extends some liability to purchasers on the secondary market 
for the first time.
217
 This is especially important in the case of 
hedge funds that purchase wholesale bundles of loans that are 
designed to fail.
218
 Unfortunately, the statute lacks teeth due to 
limitations in its securitizer/assignee liability provision.
219
 The 
provision fails to provide either a strong incentive to prevent 
originators who plan to pass on their loans to the secondary market 
from furnishing unaffordable mortgages, or a real incentive to 
prevent secondary-market assignees and securitizers from 
purchasing unaffordable, predatory loans.
220
 Still, H.R. 3915 does 
set some higher standards for lending practices, bans several 
common predatory practices for loan originators,
221
 and ends much 
of the practice of federal preemption.
222
 Far from a perfect 
solution, H.R. 3915 thus provides a modest improvement from 
previously existing anti-predatory lending enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Another way to address abuses in the subprime market is for 
Congress to enact legislation that would provide states with the 
necessary leeway to establish their own predatory lending laws.
223
 
                                                        
Support of Mortgage Reform, Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation, Nov. 15, 
2007, available at http://tubbsjones.house.gov/. 
214 See supra notes 117–33 and accompanying text.  
215 See Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191. 
216 See supra notes 141–50 and accompanying text. 
217 See H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007). 
218 Madigan, supra note 38, at 7–8. 
219 See H.R. Res. 3915 § 204 (2007). 
220 Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198; see also 
Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Lending, supra note 191. 
221 See supra notes 194–97; H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 129A, 123, 201 
et. seq (2007). 
222 See H.R. Res. 3915, 110th Cong. § 208(b) (2007). 
223 See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
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Previous state laws were far more demanding on abusive lenders 
than federal statutes, and served to deter lenders from preying on 
vulnerable populations.
224
 However, federal preemption of state 
laws radically diminished their efficacy and allowed predatory 
lenders to flourish.
225
 Therefore, cutting off preemption would 
provide states with the ability to react to problems and develop the 
necessary laws that would appeal to their constituents and serve 
consumers. 
Attorneys General also have the means to combat problems in 
the subprime market. They could expand their existing strategy of 
suing lenders to take legal action against the rating agencies that 
have made investments in bundled subprime loans appear safe.
226
 
Rating agencies, which are responsible for assessing the risk of 
investments,
227
 allegedly downplayed the risk of securitized loans. 
This decision resulted in leading additional investors purchasing 
them without fully understanding their instability and high 
likelihood of default.
228
 States are already beginning to act, 
investigating the three major ratings agencies: Moody‘s, Standard 
and Poor‘s, and Fitch Ratings.229 These agencies allegedly gave 
unduly positive ratings to securitized mortgage investments in 
exchange for payment from the issuer of the investment.
230
 By 
investigating, banning, and prosecuting these practices, the federal 
government and the states would force the ratings agencies to give 
accurate, honest assessments of the risk of securitized loans, thus 
discouraging investors from investing in bundled predatory 
                                                        
224 Id. 
225 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
226 See Krugman, supra note 190 (holding ratings agencies partially 
responsible for the mortgage crisis, allowing predatory loans to flourish and be 
easily sold in the secondary market). 
227 ―Investment banks and other financial institutions, which issue trillions 
of dollars in various types of debt for sale to investors, depend upon ratings from 
the agencies to sell their paper. The ratings rank creditworthiness and the ability 
of the issuer to repay investors.‖ Lynnley Browning, Connecticut Investigates 
Major Debt-Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at C4. 
228 Krugman, supra note 190.  
229 Browning, supra note 227. 
230 Id.  
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mortgages.
231
 From this, it could be inferred that regulation and 
prosecution of the ratings agencies would indirectly limit predatory 
lenders‘ ability to sell their loans on the secondary market, 
ultimately drying up their business. 
Finally, campaign finance reform could play a very strong role 
in preventing predatory lending. The banking industry has 
contributed millions of dollars to politicians who are members of 
both the Republican and Democratic parties.
232
 Therefore, the 
industry wields significant influence.
233
 As such, politicians have 
significantly undercut progress in regulating the lending industry 
because they fear losing campaign funds.
234
 If a law mandating full 
public financing of federal elections were to be passed, the 
purchasing of political influence through campaign contributions 
would cease to be an issue.
235
 Without this undue influence over 
legislators, the banking industry would be unable to exert 
comparable sway on the federal policy agenda.
236
 Legislators 
would then be focused more on the issues important to constituents 
than to their donors, and could develop sweeping consumer 
protection legislation that would protect borrowers. 
                                                        
231 Connecticut AG Subpoenas Debt-Rating Agencies, USA TODAY, Oct. 
26, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/ 
2007-10-26-credit-rating-agencies-subpoena_N.htm. 
232 See Center for Responsive Politics, Mortgage Bankers and Brokers: 
Long Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus. 
asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited July 27, 2008); Center for Responsive Politics, 
Securities and Investments: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=F07 (last visited July 27, 
2008).  
233 See id. 
234 See Editorial, Watered Down Mortgage Reform, supra note 198; see 
also notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
235 Under the current campaign contribution system, major donors and 
―bundlers,‖ individuals who recruit other donors to support politicians and 
parties, are often lobbyists, or once the politician to whom they contribute wins 
an election, they become lobbyists for various industries or causes, or sometimes 
even officials in that candidate‘s administration. Editorial, Candidates Bungle 
With Bundlers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2007, at 8. 
236 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to the mortgage collapse, Congress was under the 
influence of the banking industry and its ability to provide millions 
of dollars in campaign support.
237
 Consequently, it undercut 
opportunities for regulation of the subprime lending market 
through things like federal preemption.
238
 Federal anti-predatory 
lending laws had no real enforcement mechanisms, and were 
focused more on mandating disclosures and preventing loans with 
interest rates that skyrocketed above the norm. When states were 
preempted from developing their own, more stringent legislative 
solutions, state Attorneys General responded through the only 
means with which they could act—they pursued suits against 
unscrupulous lenders. These suits subjected the lenders to millions 
of dollars in costs, but failed to truly compensate injured borrowers 
or develop substantive change in the industry. Still, the suits 
provided a valuable lesson to the Attorneys General, giving them 
the opportunity to learn more about the problems at all stages in 
the subprime market and to push for change at the federal level. As 
the subprime industry has faced its inevitable collapse, Congress 
finally has the opportunity to act through its introduction of H.R. 
3915. 
While H.R. 3915 is an imperfect and somewhat weak solution, 
it is only the beginning of potential opportunities for change in 
combating predatory lending. The public is becoming more aware 
of the subprime market and is demanding change in the lending 
industry. As a result, the opportunity is ripe to build upon H.R. 
3915, to give the law the enforcement mechanisms necessary, 
close its loopholes, and utilize the facts and strategies learned from 
Attorney General Miller and his counterparts. The time is right to 
develop more stringent state and federal regulations to combat 
                                                        
237 See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71; see also Center for Responsive 
Politics, Mortgage Bankers and Brokers: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=F4600 (last visited July 
27, 2008); see also Center for Responsive Politics, Securities & Investments: 
Long-Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus. 
asp?Ind=F07 (last visited July 27, 2008). 
238 See Peterson, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
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predatory lenders. These new regulations can take into account 
substantive provisions that mirror those mentioned in the 
Household and Ameriquest suits. 
America is witnessing the collapse of not only the real estate 
market, but the entire economy as a whole. Given this economic 
landscape, it is critical that Congress, or the states, develop new 
regulations to protect at-risk homeowners. As Americans see more 
and more homes with windows boarded up and foreclosure notices 
on the door, the government must act now to stop the scourge of 
irresponsible and predatory lending. Homes, lives, and 
communities are at stake. 
 
